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WHAT'S THE HARM IN ASKING?: A DISCUSSION OF
WAIVER OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
AND EX PARTE INTERVIEWS WITH TREATING
PHYSICIANS
BY ADRIENNE M. FOX AND ROBIN L. TATUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of evidentiary privileges is in a state of flux.' While North
Carolina has recently enacted a large number of statutory privileges,2 the
General Assembly and the courts have recognized that privileges should
be strictly limited to the furtherance of their narrow purpose, so as not to
impair the search for truth.3
In cases involving a plaintiff's physical condition, personal injury and
medical malpractice, the physician-patient privilege raises many ques-
tions. Among these questions are: 1) what actions constitute a waiver by
the plaintiff; 2) what stage of the litigation the waiver may occur; 3) when
and how is the scope of any waiver determined; and, 4) who should make
* This article has been jointly written by Professor Adrienne M. Fox, of the North Carolina
Central University Law Faculty and Robin L. Tatum, J.D. candidate, May, 1990, North Carolina
Central University School of Law.
The views encouraging judicial determination of waiver and impropriety of allowing ex parte con-
ferences with treating physicians are those of Professor Fox.
The views encouraging early waiver of the physician-patient privilege and the propriety of ex parte
communications are those of Ms. Tatum, who acknowledges the assistance of Poyner and Spruill,
counsel to the North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys.
1. Courts throughout the country have recently created new exceptions to the traditional law
of privileges, limiting the scope of these privileges. Specific examples include new exceptions to the
husband-wife privilege, see U.S. v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the joint par-
ticipant privilege for separated, although not divorced parties) and to the attorney-client privilege,
see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding that legal representation
was part of a continuing criminal enterprise thus abrogating the attorney-client privilege under the
crime-fraud exception).
2. North Carolina has codified evidentiary privileges at North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tions 8-53 through 8-58.1 (1986). These include-the physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, hus-
band-wife, and clergyman-communicant, as well as the more unusual privileges for school counselor
and marital therapist.
3. Except for the priest-penitent privilege, all of the statutory privileges in North Carolina
contain language which allows a court to waive the privilege "if the interests of justice so requires."
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986). In addition, North Carolina courts have recognized the
need to order waiver in situations not contemplated by the legislature. In In re Albemarle Mental
Health Center, 42 N.C. App. 292, 256 S.E.2d 818, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 297, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979),
the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a waiver of the physician-patient and psychotherapist-
patient privilege when no action had been filed and no crime had been charged.
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the determination that waiver has occurred.4 Separate from the statutory
evidentiary privilege, the fiduciary and confidential relationship between
physician and patient is also deserving of protection.5
Although the physician-patient privilege is a testimonial privilege, gen-
erally thought to apply at trial, issues of waiver during discovery may
have serious consequences for the course of civil litigation.6 Due to
lengthy pre-trial discovery, waiver issues more frequently arise during
that stage. How is a waiver during discovery determined? Other signifi-
cant issues deal with the relationship between the privilege and the spe-
cial rules of discovery for expert witnesses.7 Finally, questions arise once
the privilege is waived, as to the propriety of ex parte interviews by op-
posing counsel.
North Carolina courts have not yet squarely addressed many of the
issues involved with waiver. The supreme court, however, did speak to
the ex parte question in the recent case of Crist v. Moffatt,8 holding that
defense counsel may not contact plaintiff's treating physicians ex parte,
regardless of waiver, without plaintiff's consent.
This article will discuss the history of the physician-patient privilege
and the confidential, fiduciary relationship existing between a physician
and his patient. The manner in which the privilege may be waived pre-
trial will also be discussed and analyzed from all points of view. Finally,
the article will discuss, in point-counterpoint fashion, the consequences
of allowing ex parte interviews of a plaintiff's physician by defense
counsel.
II. ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND OF RULES ON PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Statutory Privilege
Although many evidentiary privileges were recognized at common
law, the physician-patient privilege is purely a creature of statute.9 North
Carolina first adopted a physician-patient privilege statute in 1885.10
4. The recent case of Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734 (1987) held that waiver may
be implied on the facts and circumstances of the case.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 16-21.
6. Almost 90% of all cases are settled before trial, therefore, discovery is a significant stage of
the litigation process. Landers, Martin & Yeazell, Civil Procedure 39 (2d ed. 1988).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4) (1983); Turner v. Duke University, 325
N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
8. 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990).
9. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2380-91 (McNaughton rev. 1961); State v. Martin, 182 N.C.
846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921).
10. The privilege is currently codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986):
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any
information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and
which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or
2
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The privilege applies to information communicated by the patient to her
physician that is necessary to treatment by the physician."
The privilege belongs to the patient who may elect to waive it. 2 The
decision to waive the privilege cannot be made by the physician; how-
ever, a court may compel disclosure upon a finding that "disclosure is
necessary to a proper administration of justice."13
The privilege is a testimonial privilege, that is, one which exempts the
witness from the testimonial duty. 4 The purpose of the statute is "to
induce the patient to make full disclosure that proper treatment may be
given, to prevent public disclosure of socially stigmatized diseases, and in
some instances to protect patients from self-incrimination."' 5
B. Professional and Ethical Obligations of Physician
In addition to the testimonial privilege, other rules emanate from the
unique relationship between physician and patient. Among these are reg-
ulations and duties relating to medical ethics, all of which foster, as a
matter of public policy, the confidential and fiduciary relationship be-
tween doctor and patient. 6 The basis for this code of medical ethics is
found in the Hippocratic Oath, the American Medical Association's
(AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics, and the Current Opinions of the
Judicial Council of the AMA." Additionally, the Medico-Legal Guide-
lines of North Carolina, which contain suggested rules of conduct for
both professions, address release of medical reports, and states: "no in-
formation should be furnished by the physicial to the attorney or any
other person other than the patient, without the authorization of the pa-
tient, except where the physician-patient privilege has been abrogated by
statute ... ."8 The physician-patient privilege and the physician's code
to do any act for him as a surgeon, and no such information shall be considered public records
under G.S. 132-1. Confidential information obtained in medical records shall be furnished only
on the authorization of the patient, or if deceased, the executor, administrator, or in, the case of
unadministered estates, the next of kin. Any resident or presiding judge in the district, either at
the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial Commission pursuant to law may, subject to G.S. 8-
53.6, compel disclosure if in his opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of
justice. If the case is in district court the judge shall be a district court judge, and if the case is
in superior court the judge shall be a superior court judge.
11. Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 60 S.E. 717 (1908). See also CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 99 (5th ed. 1984) (communications with a physician for purposes
other than treatment are not privileged).
12. Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986); Carter v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 52 N.C. App.
520, 278 S.E.2d 893, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 193, 285 S.E.2d 96 (1981).
14. WIGMORE, supra note 9, at § 2196. It should be recognized, however, that a physician owes
the patient a duty of confidentiality, above and beyond any testimonial rule of evidence created by
statute. See infra text accompanying notes 16-21.
15. Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
16. Hammond v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
17. Medico-Legal Guidelines of North Carolina, Medical Reports (1986).
18. Id.
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of ethics operate separately and in tandem to protect a patient from reve-
lation of confidences disclosed during the physician-patient relationship.
The Hippocratic Oath, dating to the fifth century B.C., states:
"Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not in con-
nection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be
spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be
kept secret."' 9 The oath clarifies the physician's obligation of confidenti-
ality to his patient, independent of any statutory privilege.
The AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics also state: "A physician
shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health pro-
fessionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints
of the law."2
Finally, the Current Opinions of the Judicial Council of the AMA,
emphasize that revealing confidences requires the "express consent of the
patient," that discussions may be held with the patient's lawyer only with
the "consent of the patient" and that information may be disclosed to an
insurance company representative only if the patient "has consented."2
With this understanding of the basis for the patient's expectation of
confidentiality, it is necessary to examine the manner in which the privi-
lege may be waived.
III. EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY THE PATIENT PRIOR TO
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENCES BY HIS PHYSICIAN
A. Patient Holds the Privilege
Under North Carolina law, the physician-patient privilege rests with
the patient, and he must waive the privilege prior to any disclosure by the
physician. When the physician is named as a defendant by his patient,
the privilege is waived.2 2 The more difficult questions arise as to the
scope of the privilege for a physician who has treated the plaintiff, but is
not a party to the lawsuit. What action by the plaintiff is necessary to
waive her privilege as to this physician? At what stage of the litigation
may this waiver occur? Also, once the privilege is waived, may the treat-
ing physician be deposed as an ordinary witness? May he be interviewed
informally on an ex parte basis? May he testify to both facts and opin-
ions at trial?23 Assuming an affirmative answer to any of these questions,
19. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,
148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589, 499 N.E.2d 952, 957-58 (1986).
20. Principle IV of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics (1977).
'21. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589, 499 N.E.2d 952, 958 (1986).
22. As a general rule, all privileges are inapplicable to the extent that the person holding the
information must reveal it to protect himself from civil or criminal liability. See, e.g., Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2) (1987).
23. Some of these questions were indirectly addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
4
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a determination must be made as to the scope of the waiver and as to
how much of the plaintiff's medical history becomes fair game.
B. Commencement of the Lawsuit as Waiver of the Privilege
Jurisdictions, other than North Carolina, have taken various ap-
proaches in determining exactly what conduct of the plaintiff operates as
a waiver of the physician-patient privilege. Of course, filing a lawsuit
against the treating physician is an absolute waiver of the privilege in all
jurisdictions.24 In other types of personal injury actions, the majority
rule finds a waiver upon the mere filing of the action.2" The idea behind
the rule is that once the personal injury action has been commenced, the
plaintiff himself has voluntarily placed his physical condition into issue
and it would be manifestly unjust to allow him to select which aspects of
that condition will be revealed to the jury. This approach is especially
supportable if it could be assured that all physicians and lawyers were
capable of consistently drawing a line which would allow the waiver to
operate only regarding the physical conditions at issue. This is, however,
not always the case and for that reason other jurisdictions, including
North Carolina, have expressly rejected this approach.26
C. Explicit Waiver of the Privilege
Waiver of the physician-patient privilege may be either express or im-
plied.27 The express waiver of the privilege by the patient provides cer-
tainty to all involved in the lawsuit. If a plaintiff, during discovery,
expressly waives the privilege, this gives the go-ahead to defense counsel
to proceed with discovery on issues relating to the patient's treatment.
Although not required, the express waiver should be in writing to send a
clear and re-assuring signal to the plaintiff's non-party physicians that
they are free to testify without fear of violation of the privilege or of their
own professional ethical obligations.2"
Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) and Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1,
361 S.E.2d 706 (1987).
24. See supra note 22.
25. This approach gained notoriety in the oft-cited case, City of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (1951) where the court stated that the plaintiff-patient
"cannot have his cake and eat it too." At least thirty-three states currently adhere to this approach.
See, e.g., Trans-World Investments v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1976); Collins v. Bair, 252
N.E.2d 448 (Ind. App. 1971); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885 (N.D. 1974); Livreri v. White-
head, 122 App. Div. 2d 838, 505 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1986); Dennie v. University of Pittsburgh School of
Medicine, 638 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1986). See also Unif. R. Evid. 503. This rule, originally
proposed by the Supreme Court, but not adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, would
find a waiver when the patient's physical condition is an element of the patient's claim or defense.
As enacted, however, the federal rules leave privilege issues to the states.
26. Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734 (1987).
27. Id.
28. Physicians need to know that discussing a patient's condition does not violate their ethical
5
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D. Implied Waiver of the Privilege
Implied waiver is more controversial. North Carolina and other juris-
dictions have held that various types of conduct may constitute waiver,
even absent express consent. These approaches and a discussion of their
propriety is set out below.
1. North Carolina
North Carolina law is unsettled as to what constitutes an implied
waiver. Several interpretations can be inferred from the case law.
a. Waiver Must Be At Trial
In Cates v. Wilson,29 the court held that questions of waiver must be
resolved "largely by the facts and circumstances of the case on trial."
This statement from Cates suggests that a determination of waiver by
implication can be made only "at trial," that is during the actual trial of
the case. This position recognizes that the privilege is testimonial and
contemplates exclusion of evidence at trial. Moreover, this statement
from Cates carries the recognition that a party does not actually suffer
from the exclusion of evidence by operation of the privilege until the
privilege is actually asserted at trial in opposition to proffered evidence.
In Cates, the Court found that "certain situations, however, necessar-
ily constitute an implied waiver." 3° These include: 1) when the patient
calls the physician as a witness and examines him as to the patient's
physical condition; 2) where the patient fails to object when the opposing
party causes the physician to testify; 3) where the patient testifies to the
communication between himself and his physician; and 4) when the pa-
tient voluntarily goes into detail regarding the nature of his injuries and
testifies to what the physician did or said while in attendance.
The first two examples of the "facts and circumstances" constituting
waiver in Cates are appropriately used only to cover questions of waiver
at trial. The test is inadequate when one seeks to apply it to pre-trial
waivers which may or may not occur during discovery because it sets out
a trial, not a pre-trial scenario. The test is also inappropriately applied to
discovery because it does not require a clear expression of waiver by the
obligation and will not subject them to a civil suit in tort or contract for violating the duty not to
disclose. A written waiver will certainly protect the physician in this context, as well as diminish the
risk of subsequent controversy as to whether there has been an express waiver.
An article written to advise physicians suggested that the lawyer who represents an injured patient
should clearly inform the patient's treating physicians of the privilege, any waiver, and the scope of
the waiver. Firestone, Shi Patient Privacy and Confidentiality in a Lawsuit - Physician Privilege v.
Discovery, 13 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE #2 at 1 (1985).
29. 321 N.C. 1, 14, 361 S.E.2d 734, 742 (1987) (citing Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 15, 23, 116
S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960).
30. Id.
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plaintiff. A rule which allows for pre-trial waiver needs to be clear in
order to be fair to all parties involved.
Under North Carolina cases, a plaintiff can offer evidence of his physi-
cian's treatment without fear that a blanket waiver of the physician-pa-
tient privilege has occurred. In Neese v. Neese,3 the court allowed
plaintiff to use his physician's affidavit recounting his mental condition in
support of a motion for a temporary restraining order. Despite the plain-
tiff's affirmative offer of the testimony of Dr. Epple, the court refused to
find this to be a blanket waiver of the physician-patient privilege.
b. Waiver May Be Pre-Trial
In support of allowing pre-trial waiver, it should be recognized that an
early waiver could result in the discovery of evidence that might other-
wise go undetected if the waiver issue were postponed until an actual trial
on the merits. North Carolina courts have yet to clarify the meaning of
the facts and circumstances test set out in Cates. The language of the
case refers to determining waiver by the "facts and circumstances of the
case on trial," not the case "at trial." Arguably, the "case on trial" begins
the moment the plaintiff files suit.32 The Cates "facts and circumstances"
of testifying to the communication between plaintiff and physician or vol-
untarily going into detail about injuries, could occur at a deposition or
even during settlement discussions.33 The language in Cates does not
exclude this scenario.
It should also be recognized that while under the facts of Neese, the
court did not find waiver from the physician's affidavit, this case does not
pronounce an absolute rule that waiver could never be effected by an
affidavit. The court placed significance on the fact that the plaintiff in
Neese had never testified or otherwise revealed information relating to his
treatment. Moreover, despite the finding that this affidavit did not per se
constitute waiver, the court retained its statutory power to order disclo-
sure of otherwise privileged communications "in the interest of
justice."34
31. 1 N.C. App. 426, 161 S.E.2d 841 (1968).
32. The testimonial aspect is not the only context in which the privilege arises. See supra text
accompanying notes 16-21. Theoretically, the plaintiff could waive the privilege before trial by ex-
pressing that she no longer considers the matter confidential. This could allow immensely valuable
discovery to the defendant, regardless of whether the facts were ultimately admissible at trial. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (1983).
33. Karp v. University of North Carolina, 78 N.C. App. 214, 336 S.E.2d 640 (1984) (attorneys
answers to interrogatories were binding on plaintiff, as agent of plaintiff). Under the Karp analysis,
the attorney, as agent for his client, could make an admission of fact under N.C.R. Evid. 801 (d)
which could operate as a waiver.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986).
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2. Other Jurisdictions
a. Actions Indicating Waiver
In contrast to the rule which finds waiver upon the filing of the law-
suit, a more limited rule holds that the action must be stayed until the
patient consents to a waiver.3 5 This is not a viable solution, however,
because it forces the plaintiff to choose between obtaining no redress or
waiving the privilege.
Attempts have been made to limit waiver to the condition at issue.
Some courts have held that waiver of the privilege as to one physician
waives it to all other physicians who have treated the same condition. 6 If
properly monitored, this would be a fair approach.37 The court in
Sklagen v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital3" explained this the-
ory. The plaintiff had released medical records of physicians who treated
her after her injury, but refused to release any records from those physi-
cians who had treated her for the same conditions before the injury oc-
curred. In finding a waiver, the court concluded that it would be "unfair
to allow plaintiff to invoke the privilege to shield materials which are
potentially damaging."39 The plaintiff was using the privilege to control
the manner in which the defense could develop its case.'
Another approach finds that specific affirmative conduct by the plain-
tiff operates as a waiver. So long as the facts and circumstances approach
is used in North Carolina,4" this is a likely direction the courts here will
take.
4 2
Some states find that releasing medical reports constitutes a waiver of
the physician-patient privilege. For example, in Scharlack v. Richmond
Memorial Hospital,4 3 the court held that the plaintiff waived the physi-
cian-patient privilege by introducing her medical records at trial. How-
35. Marine v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Autry v.
United States, 27 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
36. Sklagen v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984).
37. See CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 103 at 255-56 (5th ed. 1984).
38. 625 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984).
39. Id. at 992.
40. These facts demonstrate that allowing a waiver only at trial could result in prejudice to the
defendant. See also Jimerson v. Prendergast, 697 P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1985) (providing testimony of
one physician waives the privilege to others treating the same condition).
41. Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E. 2d 734 (1987).
42. As cases are appealed, certain conduct will be found to amount to a waiver, while other
conduct will not. Under a facts and circumstances test, precedent may prove unreliable as to what is
a waiver and what is not. In Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), the supreme court
"assumed," but did not specifically "decide" that plaintiff had waived the privilege by her pre-trial
conduct of cooperating with discovery. Even assuming waiver, the court held that ex parte contacts
were improper.
43. 102 A.D.2d 886, 477 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1984). See also Schuler v. United States, 113 F.R.D.
518 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (a Michigan statute requires that the plaintiff accompany any release of
medical records with a written response asserting the privilege or it is waived); Clark v. Clark, 220
Neb. 771, 371 N.W.2d 749 (1985) (privilege waived by allowing a third party to review medical
8
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ever, even in these jurisdictions, the determination of whether waiver has
occurred is generally based on an analysis of the facts and circumstances
of each case, rather than the application of a bright-line rule.
b. Depositions
Certain pre-trial actions, such as testifying at a deposition, have also
been found to constitute waiver. However, some courts draw a distinc-
tion between depositions given by the plaintiff to preserve testimony and
a true adversarial discovery deposition."
Some courts have held that a plaintiff's testimony at a deposition con-
stitutes waiver.45 The rationale underlying these cases is that testimony
at a deposition is no more confidential than at trial. The purpose of the
privilege no longer exists once the patient has expressed an intent to re-
veal the medical information rather than to keep it a secret. Conse-
quently, the exact point in time that a plaintiff chooses to disclose
confidential information is not controlling. There is also authority that
orally discussing privileged information at a pre-trial conference waives
the privilege.46
i. Involuntary Deposition Testimony and Compliance with
Discovery Does Not Constitute Waiver.
Some cases make a distinction as to discovery depositions taken not for
perpetuation of testimony at the plaintiff's instance, but taken by the
defendant for discovery. One rationale for this differing treatment is set
out in Hemminghaus v. Ferguson,47 where the court held that a party's
admissions must be voluntary in order to waive the privilege, and that is
not the case when the admissions are made to an adverse party. Similar
results apply when the court finds that the plaintiff's testimony is ob-
tained by compulsion, and not voluntarily.48 Generally, a person's testi-
records); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988) (court order required even
though plaintiff voluntarily produced medical records).
44. This distinction may be merely ephemeral in that a deposition contemplated as a discovery
deposition could be admitted as trial testimony if the witness becomes unavailable. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § IA-1, R. Civ. P. 32 (1983).
45. Patania v. Silverstone, 3 Ariz. App. 424, 415 P.2d 139 (1966) (waiver occurred when pa-
tient discussed the substance of her communication with her physician at a deposition); Covington v.
Sawyer, 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465 (1983) (decedent's privilege waived when she testified
about her condition and the physician's treatment in a video deposition before she died). Neither of
these cases indicated whether a pre-trial ruling had waived the privilege. See also Green v. M.
Nirenberg Sons, Inc. 166 Misc. 652, 3 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1938) (holding that waiver was accomplished by
patient's intention to use the deposition at trial); In re Roberto, 106 Ohio App. 303, 151 N.E.2d 37
(1958); In re Loewenthal's Petition, 101 Ohio App. 355, 134 N.E.2d 158 (1956) (privilege waived for
deposition, but decision did not extend to determination of waiver at trial).
46. Whitman v. United States, 108 F.R.D. 5 (D.N.H. 1985) (self-evaluative privilege waived).
47. 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 481 (1948).
48. Hughes v. Kackas, 3 App. Div. 2d 402, 161 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1957).
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mony on cross-examination is found to be involuntary, and therefore not
a waiver of the privilege.49 A party's appearance at a deposition pursuant
to subpoena or the adverse party's notice of deposition is also considered
involuntary, and therefore not a valid, intentional waiver.5"
Waiver of the physician-patient privilege during discovery has been
addressed by courts in other jurisdictions. In Phipps v. Sasser,5" the pa-
tient's pre-trial deposition, answers to written interrogatories, and volun-
tary supplying of medical records to defendant were found not to
constitute waiver of the privilege in the absence of a showing that the
patient intended to waive the privilege. The Washington court analyzed
opinions from the federal courts whose rules of civil procedure and dis-
covery are virtually the same as that state's.52 The Washington court,
like the federal courts cited, refused to adopt a blanket rule of accelerated
or pre-trial waiver whenever a plaintiff files suit and puts her medical
condition in issue.
The Washington court noted approvingly the practice of one federal
court which provided for notice to plaintiff once it appeared that the
privilege had been waived in discovery, stating that waiver would be
deemed to have occurred "unless within five days from receipt of this
ruling the plaintiff, in writing, informs the court that such waiver is not
intended and will not occur."" A practice like this has the benefit of
announcing to all involved that a determination of waiver is being made.
A clear indication of waiver is highly preferable to the uncertain situation.
created by the "facts and circumstances" test. The unilateral decision on
waiver made by defense counsel inadequately protects plaintiff's privilege
and also inadequately protects the physicians contacted who may become
liable to plaintiff for tortious breach of the privilege.54
The Phipps court also focused on the purpose of discovery and the
adversary use of depositions. The court refused to find that plaintiff's
49. Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430 (D.C. Ohio 1962).
50. Bond v. Independent Order of Foresters, 69 Wash. 2d 879, 421 P.2d 351 (1966). See also
Buffa v. Scott, 147 Ariz. 140, 142, 708 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1985); State ex rel. Grimm v. Ashmanskaus,
298 Or. 206, 690 P.2d 1063 (1984); Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wash. 2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968); Annota-
tion, Pretrial Testimony or Disclosure on Discovery by Party to Personal Injury Action as to Nature of
Injuries or Treatment as Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege, 25 A.L.R.3D 1401 (1966).
51. 74 Wash. 2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968).
52. This is also the case in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1 (1983).
53. Phipps, (citing Greene v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 40 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio, 1966)).
54. See Firestone, supra note 28. Many jurisdictions have recognized a tort claim by the patient
against the physician for wrongfully divulging confidential communications. See, e.g., Home v. Pat-
ton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1974); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. App.
1985); Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 9, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224,
177 N.W. 831 (1920); Watts v. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d
242 (1985); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985); Smith v. Driscoll,
94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917). See generally, Comment, To Tell or Not To Tell; Physicians'
Liability for Disclosure of Confidential Information About a Patient, 13 COMB. L. REV. 617 (1983);
Comment, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
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testimony in a pre-trial deposition as to the extent and nature of his inju-
ries constituted a waiver. The decision rested on the fact that the testi-
mony was in response to the defendant's pretrial subpoena (or notice of
deposition), because the plaintiff is being examined as an adverse witness
in such a situation." The difference between a deposition and trial testi-
mony is significant. In Cates v. Wilson, the North Carolina Supreme
Court was concerned that plaintiff at trial had voluntarily, on her own
behalf, in her case-in-chief, testified about her medical condition, and
only later during the defense case had asserted physician-patient privilege
in response to testimony by her physicians for defendant. The Cates
court expressed fear that a plaintiff would try to use the privilege as a
sword rather than a shield.5 6 That concern is valid at trial, but when a
plaintiff testifies in a deposition as an adverse witness, there can certainly
be no valid accusation that this is an attempt to use the privilege as a
sword.
ii. Failure to Assert Privilege During a Deposition or Discovery
Does Constitute Waiver
The counter-argument, however, is that the patient need only object or
assert the privilege when the question is asked.57 It would then be clear
that no waiver had occurred. This is certainly true in the context of
other privileges. There is no bar to assertion of the privilege merely be-
cause of the adversarial nature of the proceeding or the form of question-
ing. For example, on cross-examination, a witness retains his right to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination.5"
The patient is afforded the privilege for her own protection. She may
assert it and refuse to speak regardless of the context in which a question
is addressed. Once she has chosen to speak, however, allowing the re-
maining relevant and related information to be protected by the privilege
is permitting the privilege to be used as a sword rather than a shield. The
plaintiff is no more authorized to make unilateral decisions than is the
defendant. This is, however, what occurs when the plaintiff can essen-
tially decide that only favorable testimony regarding her claim will be
disclosed, but the privilege can operate to allow any potentially damaging
information to remain secret.59
55. Phipps, 74 Wash. 2d 439, 445 P.2d 624 (1968).
56. Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 361 S.E.2d 734 (1987).
57. See CLEARY, supra note 11, at § 103. Failure to assert the privilege, even within the adver-
sarial setting, is a persuasive argument for finding waiver, especially when plaintiff is represented by
counsel.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. Evid. 608(b) (1988). "The giving of testimony, whether by an
accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when [cross] examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility."
59. See also North Carolina State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2 (7)
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E. Wh Should Determine That a Waiver Has Occurred?
Another debated issue is who should determine whether there has been
a waiver of the physician-patient privilege. One approach finds that a
judge is the only proper person to make this decision. The other allows
defense counsel to make the determination, without interference by the
court.
1. Judicial Determination Is Necessary
The "facts and circumstances" test is inadequate in its failure to offer a
"bright-line" test for determining when waiver by implication has oc-
curred. More significant is the problem of who is to act as the fact-finder
to determine that one of these conditions has been met - the plaintiff,
his attorney, the defendant, his attorney, the physician who is asked to
testify as a result of a purported waiver, or a sitting judge? In both Cates
and Capps, questions of facts and circumstances constituting implied
waiver arose during trial and the trial judge made the determination.
Reference to the statute, which specifically allows a sitting judge to waive
the privilege underscores the obvious answer that a trial judge must be
involved in the determination that the "facts and circumstances" of
waiver have been met. The unilateral decision by defense counsel that
waiver by implication has occurred is dangerous because of the absence
of protection for the plaintiff and the danger to the physicians whose
conversations with defense counsel could be actionable.
A review of cases involving a sitting judge's order waiving the physi-
cian-patient privilege confirms that a judge can become involved at any
stage of litigation to make determinations of waiver.' North Carolina
courts have the authority to compel disclosure of privileged information
when "disclosure is necessary to a proper administration of justice."6
This power exists prior to trial, and in a criminal case, even prior to the
filing of criminal charges.6" Clearly, the statutory privilege is a qualified
one, and waiver can be determined and even ordered by the trial court -
but not unilaterally by opposing counsel.
Under North Carolina cases interpreting the physician-patient privi-
lege, it has been held that only a sitting judge has the authority to compel
disclosure of privileged information prior to trial. In Carter v. Colonial
(1988). The rule forbids an attorney from obstructing another party's access to evidence. Asserting
the privilege once waiver clearly has occurred arguably runs afoul of this Rule.
60. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988) (plaintiff had voluntarily
produced medical records, however, a court order was required to support the claim of voluntary
waiver of the privilege).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986).
62. In re Albemarle Mental Health Center, 42 N.C. App. 292, 256 S.E.2d 818, cert. denied, 298
N.C. 297, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979).
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Life and Accident Insurance Company,63 the court reasoned:
The statute allows the judge to override the physician-patient privilege
when he believes the proper administration of justice so requires. In or-
der to protect the privilege from abusive treatment by those not directly
involved in the case, it is important that only the trial judge, either at
trial or prior to trial, be the one to order disclosure by a physician of
privileged information. 64
Even though North Carolina General Statute section 8-5365 has been
amended since this decision, the amendment affects only the "trial"
judge's authority to compel disclosure. Under current law, any resident
or presiding judge can now order disclosure. The amendment changed
only who can order disclosure, not the requirement that determinations
of waiver and disclosure be only by judicial determination.
The wisdom of a clear determination of privilege is reinforced by an
examination of North Carolina cases applying privilege law in other ar-
eas. In a recent case applying the husband-wife testimonial privilege, the
North Carolina Supreme Court cautioned trial judges that there should
be an on-the-record determination that the testifying spouse understood
her privilege not to testify and made the waiver knowingly.66
North Carolina law now provides for and requires the active determi-
nation by a judge that the physician-patient privilege has been waived by
implication or should be waived in the interests of justice. The court
should clearly indicate that this same procedure applies to a waiver dur-
ing discovery, and that unilateral determinations by opposing counsel,
with their obvious interest and zeal in defending their own clients, is im-
proper and dangerous to the legally protected interests of all parties
involved.
2. Judicial Determination is Not Necessary
The counter-argument to the requirement of judicial determination
recognizes that in order to protect the defendant's interest, there should
be a quick and easy way to determine waiver at an early stage of the
63. 52 N.C. App. 520, 279 S.E.2d 873 (1981).
64. Id. at 528, 279 S.E.2d at 897.
65. No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose
any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character,
and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician,
or to do any act for him as a surgeon, and no such information shall be considered public
records under G.S. 132-1. Confidential information obtained in medical records shall be fur-
nished only on the authority of the patient, or if deceased, the executor, administrator, or, in the
case of unadministered estates, the next of kin. Any resident or presiding judge in the district,
either at the trial or prior thereto, or the Industrial Commission pursuant to law may, subject to
G.S.8-53.6, compel disclosure if in his opinion disclosure is necessary to a proper administration
ofjustice. If the case is in district court, the judge shall be a district court judge, and if the case
is in superior court the judge shall be a superior court judge.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-64 (1986).
66. State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 765, 360 S.E.2d 660 (1987).
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litigation without a judicial ruling. Requiring the question to be resolved
at trial or to subject the defendant to a lengthy and expensive procedure
once the patient has demonstrated that she no longer considers the infor-
mation privileged, is an unfair burden on the defendant and on the court
system.
The privilege is important, but so is the right of the defendant to ade-
quately prepare his case before going to trial. Requiring every waiver
question to be decided by a judge is a waste of time and judicial re-
sources. This is especially true in situations where the plaintiff has
clearly engaged in conduct that prior courts have held to be an implied
waiver. In uncertain situations, a judicial determination may prevent
subsequent controversies but is by no means mandatory. Admittedly,
defense counsel cannot compel disclosure as a trial judge could, but he is
capable of evaluating whether a plaintiff has chosen to make her condi-
tion public. Once this has occurred, the burden should be on the plaintiff
to show why her partial disclosure is not a divisible waiver, an approach
expressly rejected by the court in Cates.67
IV. PROPRIETY OF Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH PHYSICIANS
ONCE THE PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the
propriety of ex parte communications by defense counsel with plaintiff's
non-treating physicians. In Crist v. Moffatt,68 the court held that exparte
contact is improper without first obtaining plaintiff's consent or utilizing
the statutory methods of discovery, for reasons totally separate from the
physician-patient privilege. This section is not an attempt to re-argue
Crist, but rather to examine its implications.69
Other jurisdictions which have decided the issue are split on the pro-
priety of ex parte interviews. Arguments for and against involve the bal-
ance between the plaintiff's interest in confidentiality and the opposing
party's right to obtain all relevant evidence and adequately prepare his
case.
A. Ex Parte Interviews Should Not Be Allowed
Many strong arguments exist for refusing to allow ex parte communi-
67. "A divisible waiver could enable plaintiffs to elicit from their physicians factual details
underlying their cases and then preclude the physician from placing this information in a relevant
context." Cates, 321 N.C. at 16, 361 S.E.2d at 743. The plaintiff cannot use the privilege defensively
and offensively at the same time. Once the plaintiff reveals information about her treatment, "the
privilege evaporates." Id. at 14, 361 S.E.2d at 742. This occurs whether a judge decides it or not.
68. 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). Ex parte in this context refers to defense counsel
speaking with these witnesses on an informal basis without the plaintiff or his attorney being present.
69. In Crist, the court forbid the ex parte interviews based primarily on considerations of public
policy.
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cations with a plaintiff's treating physician, even after a clear waiver of
the physician-patient privilege by the patient. The majority of jurisdic-
tions have refused to sanction ex parte interviews. This is because of
the broad privacy interest underlying the physician-patient relationship,
the potential tort liability of physicians for invasion of privacy, the poten-
tial that defense counsel may seek to improperly influence plaintiff's
treating physicians or may discourage the physician from testifying, the
duty of loyalty from the physician to the plaintiff, and the view that dis-
covery rules determine the extent of waiver of the physician-patient
privilege.7 °
First, even if the privilege is waived by the patient, the waiver is not
absolute, but only exists as to information which is relevant to the law-
suit.7 1 Who is to inform the physician of the scope of the waiver, and
who is to enforce it? This limitation is necessary to assure that highly
personal, irrelevant and possibly prejudicial information is not inadver-
tently released by the physician to opposing counsel. 72 Not only could
this be damaging to the plaintiff at trial, but it could severely affect settle-
ment as in the situation where the patient has an unrelated mental or
psychological condition which would make the trauma of living through
a trial very difficult. Is this information which correctly belongs in the
hands of defense counsel?
This issue has been addressed by other courts and the following discus-
sion is instructive:
We do not mean to question the integrity of doctors and lawyers or to
suggest that we must control discovery in order to assure their ethical
conduct. We are concerned, however, with the difficulty of determining
whether a particular piece of information is relevant to the claim being
litigated. Placing the burden of determining relevancy on an attorney,
who does not know the nature of the confidential disclosure about to be
elicited is risky. Asking the physician, untrained in the law, to assume
this burden is a greater gamble and is unfair to the physician. We believe
this determination is better made in a setting in which counsel for each
70. Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician,
50 A.L.R.4th 714, 717 (1986). In Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), the court
affirmed the trial court's remedial order requiring defense counsel to disclose to plaintiff the sub-
stance of all conversations with plaintiff's physicians, but refused to rule on the admissibility at trial
of information learned through ex parte contacts on the basis on prematurity. Some courts have
even gone so far as to impose an exclusionary rule barring the introduction of any evidence that was
the fruit of the exparte interview. Karsten v. McCray, 147 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1379 (1987),
cert. denied, 115 Il. Dec. 400, 520 N.E.2d 394 (1987); Yates v. El-Deiry, 160 Ill. App. 3d 190, 201,
513 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1987), cert. denied 117 Ill. 233, 520 N.E.2d 394 (1988); Piller v. Kovarsky, 194
N.J. Super. 392, 476 A.2d 1279, 1282 (1988).
.71. Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1988); Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte
Interview with the Injured Party's Treating Physician, 50 A.L.R.4TH 714 (1986).
72. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). See also Wenninger v. Muesing, 307
Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976).
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party is present and the court is available to settle disputes.
73
The physician who is contacted by defense counsel on an ex parte basis
is put in an extremely difficult situation when the defendant-physician is
a member of the same profession. There is subtle, unspoken pressure to
cooperate with the defendant who has been sued and "There but for the
grace of God go I" is not an infrequent response. Typically, the defense
counsel represents a medical malpractice carrier, who is often the carrier
for the physician-witness as well. The pressure on the treating physician
could lead him to unwittingly become an advocate for his colleague. This
problem has been recognized:
An unauthorized ex parte interview could disintegrate into a discussion
of the impact of a jury's award upon a physician's professional reputa-
tion, the rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums, the notion that
the treating physician might be the next person to be sued, and other
topics which might influence the treating physician's views.
74
The most commonly asserted rationale for precluding ex parte inter-
views is that it is not a specified method allowed by the discovery rules.
Defense counsel is, therefore, limited to the formal devices set out by the
rules of civil procedure.75 Several courts have field that even upon
waiver of the physician-patient privilege, the patient has only waived his
right to object to formal methods of discovery prescribed by the rules of
civil procedure.76 In the absence of some authorization, the trial court
has no power to allow the interviews.77 Since conventional discovery
methods do remain available to defense counsel, they should refrain from
ex parte interviews altogether.78
Another problem with ex parte communications is recognition of the
fact that, despite the recent dictum in Turner v. Duke University,79 a phy-
sician who has treated a party to a lawsuit is not an ordinary "facts and
73. Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 678, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (1988) (quoting Roosevelt
Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986)).
74. Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center of N.E. Pa., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (M.D. Pa.
1987) (quoted in Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990)).
75. Namely, depositions, interrogatories, physical examinations, requests for production of doc-
uments, etc. See, e.g., Crist, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990).
76. Crist, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). See also Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443
(D.N.D. 1981); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn.
405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Jaap v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1389 (Mont. 1981); Anker v. Brodnitz,
98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1976).
77. See Stoller v. Moo Young Jun, 118 A.D.2d 637, 499 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1986); Johnson v.
District Court of Oklahoma County, 738 P.2d 151 (Okla. 1987) (the court has no power to order
discovery by methods not specifically enumerated in the rules of civil procedure).
78. Crist, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). See also Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443
(D.N.D. 1981). Moreover, formal discovery will not reveal defense counsel's work-product. Discov-
ery depositions are taken everyday and experienced counsel are well aware of how to take a deposi-
tion without disclosing one's strategy to his adversary. Suplee, Depositions. Objectives, Strategies,
Tactics, Mechanics and Problems, THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION, 255, 270 (1982).
79. 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
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circumstances" witness like the good Samaritan who just happened to
witness a fender bender.8 0 The physician has, through the course of his
professional treatment of the plaintiff, developed a relationship of trust
and confidence."' Even if the privilege is waived, the relationship of trust
and confidence is seriously undermined if the patient learns that her phy-
sician has been talking to her adversary "behind her back." 2 The medi-
cal profession should be alarmed by this development, especially as it
impinges on the requirements of medical ethics and the Hippocratic
Oath. 3 The confidential and fiduciary relationship between physician
and patient has been found to be deserving of protection, independent of
any statutory evidentiary privilege.8 4
The suggestion that the patient may have a cause of action against an
offending physician begs the question and certainly ignores the resulting
loss of the therapeutic relationship that had existed between the physi-
cian and patient. As a matter of public policy, ex parte communications
should not be allowed to impinge on this relationship. 5
The argument that an easier, less formal, and more economical means
for gaining information from doctors is needed and that only ex parte
communications allow for this fails to consider the ethical restrictions
put on plaintiff's counsel when the defendant is a corporation. 6 Counsel
80. Of course, plaintiff's counsel can designate the treating physician as an expert, and there-
fore limit discovery by the adversary. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Rule 11 limits arbitrary designa-
tion of treating physicians as experts to circumvent "wide-open" discovery, but it is very hard to
determine when the designation was not made in good faith. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 11. Merely failing to
call the physician as a witness is not enough, because many factors influence the ultimate decision of
what experts to use at trial.
81. The physician-patient relationship has been referred to as "a fiduciary one of the highest
degree... involving every element of trust, confidence and good faith." Lockett v. Goodill, 71 Wash.
2d 654, 656, 430 P.2d 589, 591 .(1967). "
82. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this problem and stated: "[W]e find it difficult to
believe that a physician can engage in an ex parte conference with the legal adversary of his patient
without endangering the trust and faith invested in him by his patient." Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc.
148 Ill. App. 3d 595, 581, 499 N.E.2d 952, 962 (1986). See also Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Minn.
405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
84. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990); Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325
S.E.2d 469 (1985); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956); Watts v. Cumberland
County Hospital System, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242, aff'd in part, rey'd in part, 317 N.C.
321, 345 S.E.2d 201 (1986); Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
85. The North Carolina courts have zealously protected the physician-patient relationship in a
number of situaiions. See, e.g., Hewett v. Bullard, 258 N.C. 347, 128 S.E.2d 411 (1962) (the court
extended special protection to the patient involved in financial dealings with his own physician be-
cause of the unique nature of the confidential relationship); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90
S.E.2d 754 (1956) (the relationship between patient and treating physician is that of a "status" rather
than one created merely be contract).
86. See North Carolina State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.4 (1988).
This rule prohibits an attorney from contacting an adverse party who is represented by counsel. If
the defendant is an organization, this includes its managers, any employee for whom the organiza-
tion could be liable under principles of respondeat superior or an employee whose statement would
constitute an admission by the organization.
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is forbidden from communicating directly with an adversary. In a medi-
cal negligence case, typically the adversary is a hospital - corporate de-
fendant. It is not unusual for the plaintiff to have received treatment
from other doctors at the hospital, who would fall into the category of
treating, non-defendant physicians. But because of Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.4, plaintiff's counsel will be forbidden from using inexpensive
and informal interviews to learn what the witness knows. Allowing ex
parte interviews would only exacerbate any perceived inequity or lack of
reciprocity regarding access to witnesses.8 7
In medical malpractice cases, the defendant has a privilege which is
virtually indestructible by the plaintiff. The peer review privilege or
medical review committee privilege protects all records of hospital Medi-
cal Review Committees relating to the evaluation of the quality of health
care from discovery and from admissibility."8
Moreover, ex parte conferences with physicians are fraught with dan-
ger for defense counsel. For instance, if the physician testifies at trial in a
manner inconsistent with the informal statements 89 defense counsel is in
the untenable situation of having to withdraw as counsel in order to tes-
tify to impeach the physician-witness. 90
B. Ex Parte Interviews Should Be Allowed
The North Carolina Supreme Court erroneously decided Crist and ex
parte contact with plaintiff's non-treating physicians should be allowed.
Courts which allow ex parte interviews "have identified a number of fac-
tors and policies for allowing such informal methods of discovery.... 
A variety of these reasons are outlined and explained below.
87. An interesting situation developed in Washington where a formal ethics opinion had held
that a lawyer could interview a physician in the same manner as any other witness and a supreme
court opinion had held that opposing counsel could interview employees of the corporation so long
as such employees were neither authorized to speak for the corporation nor in a management posi-
tion. See Washington State Bar Association Formal Ethics Opinion 180 (1985); Wright v. Group
Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984). Even in light of that precedent, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that ex parte communications with a physician, even after waiver of the
privilege, were improper and that the direct involvement of counsel was necessary in any contact
between defense counsel and a plaintiff's physician because of "the unique nature of the physician-
patient relationship and the dangers which ex parte interviews pose." Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash.
2d 675, 681, 756 P.2d 138, 142 (1988).
88. The privilege is found at North Carolina General Statute section 131E-95 (1988) and has
been interpreted in Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986).
89. See Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988).
90. N.C. State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct 5.2 (1988).
91. Annotation, Discovery. Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician,
50 A.L.R.4T 714 (1986). See also Sterchi and Sheppard, Defendant's Right to Secure Medical Infor-
mation and Records Concerning the Plaintiff, 53 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 46, 46 (1984). "Defense counsel
... should insist on the execution of release of medical information and records which allow counsel
to discuss the claimant's care and treatment rendered by the treating physician without the presence
of opposing counsel." Id.
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One of the most compelling and frequently asserted arguments for al-
lowing ex parte interviews is that no party has any proprietary right in a
witness.92 Forbidding access to these witnesses places the defendant at a
disadvantage, in that his access to relevant and non-privileged informa-
tion has been unduly hindered.9" As a general rule, counsel are not re-
stricted from interviewing the opposing party's witnesses in a civil or
criminal trial in the absence of an applicable privilege.94
Several jurisdictions have allowed ex parte contact based upon this ra-
tionale. In Doe v. Eli Lilly & Company,95 the court found defense coun-
sel's ex parte interviews with non-treating physicians to be entirely
proper. The court stated:
No party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any
witness's evidence absent a privilege. No party is entitled to restrict an
opponent's access to a witness, however partial or important to him, by
insisting upon some notion of allegiance. Even an expert whose knowl-
edge has been purchased cannot be silenced by the party who is paying
him on that ground alone. Unless impeded by privilege, an adversary
may inquire in advance of trial, by any lawful manner to learn what the
witness knows if other appropriate conditions the witness alone may im-
pose are satisfied.
9 6
Following waiver of the physician-patient privilege, the physician is on
the same ground as any other fact or occurrence witness, and must be
treated as such.97 It has long been recognized that counsel has a right to
interview the opposing party's witnesses in private, with no record being
made. If there has been a waiver, confidentiality regarding that matter no
longer exists.
In a recent North Carolina Supreme Court case, Turner v. Duke Uni-
92. See id. at 55. A party is not entitled to instruct the witnesses to refuse to cooperate with
opposing counsel. See also North Carolina State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
7.9(d) (1988) which states: "A lawyer shall not... [riequest a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless (1) the person is a relative or
employee or other agent of the client; and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's inter-
ests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information." A treating physician
obviously falls without any of the exceptions, therefore, the plaintiff's attorney would be subject to
discipline for attempting to instruct the treating physicians not to speak with defense counsel.
93. Amicus Curiae Brief (North Carolina Society for Obstetricians and Gynecologists) for Ap-
pellant at 13, Crist v. Moffat, 324 N.C. 543, 380 S.E.2d 769 (1989) (No. 69PA89).
94. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (citing Model Rule of Professional
Ethics, Canon 39).
95. 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983).
96. Id. at 128. The witness himself may refuse to cooperate. This choice should be made inde-
pendently, without influence from plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel. See supra note 92 for the ethical
repercussions.
97. Turner v. Duke University, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989). See also Sklagen v.
Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 625 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501
A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Wesley Medical Center v. Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 669 P.2d 209
(1983); Kurdek v. West Orange Board of Educ., 222 N.J. Super. 218, 536 A.2d 332 (1987).
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versity,98 the court recognized a distinction between the physician witness
who is an expert and one who is not. Although the issue did not concern
ex parte interviews,99 the court stated: "Although by general definition
all doctors may be considered experts in that they possess a specialized
knowledge of medicine beyond that of the layman, not every role of a
doctor as a witness in a legal controversy is in the capacity of an 'ex-
pert'." The commentary to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)101 explains that an "expert whose information was not acquired
in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter
of the lawsuit.., should be treated as an ordinary witness."' 2 Applying
this rationale to the propriety of ex parte communications, the physician
becomes an ordinary witness once the privilege is waived and there is no
remaining reason to treat him differently.
A second justification for allowing ex parte contact is that it saves time
and money in the often lengthy and expensive discovery process. It pro-
vides for "decreased litigation costs, the potential to eliminate non-essen-
tial witnesses, early evaluation and settlement of claims and easier
scheduling of interviews than depositions."' 03 Since the plaintiff can
speak with these physicians ex parte, he is spared the high cost of deposi-
tions. In order to obtain the same information, however, the defendant
must bear the expense of a deposition, if ex parte interviews are forbid-
den. This financial advantage definitely weighs unfairly in plaintiff's
favor. It is improper to allow the plaintiff to use discovery methods to
burden the defendant when they were intended to simplify pre-trial
procedures. 10'
The court in Trans World Investments v. Drobney,10 5 explained that
the purpose of the discovery rules is to reduce trial complexity. Ex parte
interviews certainly advance this purpose more fully than formal deposi-
tions. This is especially true in light of the fact that the witness may, in
98. 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
99. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had violated an order to identify an expert
witness prior to trial. Since the witness in question was not an expert, but a physician testifying to
facts and circumstances learned by his treatment of the plaintiff (an "actor" in the events giving rise
to the lawsuit), the court found the physician was an "ordinary witness."
100. Turner, 325 N.C. at 167-68, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I (1983).
102. Id. In Crist, the supreme court totally ignored the Turner decision. In Turner, the court
stated that the non-expert physician is an ordinary witness. In Crist, it held the opposite by conclud-
ing that the physician witness is somehow entitled to additional protection. See Crist, 326 N.C. at
-, 389 S.E.2d at -.
103. Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician,
50 A.L.R.4th 714, 717 (1986). See, e.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983);
Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985).
104. Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
105. 554 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1976).
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fact, possess no relevant information whatsoever. The plaintiff could dis-
cover this ex parte, but the defendant would have to depose the witness in
order to obtain exactly the same information.10 6 Less costly methods of
discovery should always be encouraged. Additionally, once there has
been a waiver of the privilege, discovery may proceed without judicial
interference."0 7
Another principle which should not be forgotten is that physicians are
bound by a code of ethics.10 8 This should operate to preclude the witness
from divulging information beyond the scope of the waiver, i.e., regard-
ing another condition, during the ex parte interview. The duty of confi-
dentiality will be adhered to by the physician, therefore, protecting the
rights of the plaintiff."°
Some courts allow ex parte interviews on the basis that if a breach of
confidentiality does occur, it is up to the medical profession and not the
legal system to deal with it. "0 The patient may always sue the doctor if a
breach does occur. "' Litigation should not, of course, be encouraged,
but on the other hand, it is likewise insulting to the professional integrity
of the physician to assume a breach will occur before it happens.' 2 Bad
intentions or motives should never be presumed." 3 There is always a risk
that opposing counsel will attempt to improperly influence any witness,
but there are sanctions for such conduct." 4 The exclusionary rule is,
however, a very extreme remedy, which should only be invoked if abso-
lutely necessary.1"
If defense counsel is not allowed to interview treating physicians ex
106. Arguably, interrogatories could be used, however, these are directed to the plaintiff, rather
than to the physician. Though inexpensive, interrogatories do not allow observation of the witness's
demeanor, which can be accomplished only by the more expensive formal discovery device of a
deposition.
107. Arctic Motor Freight v. Stover, 571 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1977) (a physician cannot be forbid-
den from speaking with defense counsel in a candid and common sense manner). In Crist, the
supreme court stated that it did not intend "to discourage consensual informal discovery." Crist,
326 N.C. at -, 389 S.E.2d at -. This is, however, essentially what it has done by requiring plain-
tiff's consent to ex parte interviews.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
109. Moss v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988).
110. Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1984).
111. Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. North Carolina courts have condoned this
cause of action. Watts v. Cumberland County Hosp. System, 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242, disc.
review denied as to additional issues, 314 N.C. 548, 335 S.E.2d 27 (1985), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 317 N.C. 321, 345 S.E.2d 201 (1986).
112. The privilege arises from the medical profession, which is in the best position to monitor it.
Nothing in an attorney's ethical responsibilities precludes ex parte interviews. A.B.A. Comm. on
Professional Ethics Informal Op. 892 (1965). See also The Medical Legal Guidelines of North Caro-
lina at 574 (1986) (it is ethical to interview witnesses of the opponent so long as there is no breach of
confidentiality).
113. Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 480 A.2d 223 (1984).
114. See North Carolina State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.9 (1988)
(prohibiting an attorney from attempting to influence a witness's testimony).
115. Schwartz v. Goldstein, 400 Mass. 152, 508 N.E.2d 97 (1987).
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parte, then any information that these witnesses may have must be ob-
tained in the presence of the plaintiff and opposing counsel. This raises
another concern; namely that this may be a violation of the work product
doctrine.' 16 Witness interviews certainly are a part of work product, and
because they are not discoverable, should not be so easily made available
to opposing counsel. Such interviews are essential to defense counsel as
well, to enable interpretation of the plaintiff's medical records and physi-
cal condition. At least one court 1 7 allowed ex parte interviews based
upon this argument stating that to require the presence of plaintiff's
counsel would "lay bare matters of trial strategy and mental or legal the-
ories of the opponent."' 
18
Lastly, there is no specific statute, rule of procedure, or rule of evi-
dence which forbids ex parte interviews. 1 9 When this factor is added to
the balance between the interest in confidentiality and the right of the
defendant to prepare his case, it certainly tips the scales in the defend-
ant's favor. Again, once waiver has occurred and the physician becomes
a regular witness, there is no rule or supportable reason which would
prevent defense counsel from speaking with these individuals ex parte.
V. CONSIDERATION OF COMPETING INTERESTS REGARDING
WAIVER AND Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
A. The balance favors the public policy of preserving the confidential,
fiduciary physician-patient relationship and forbidding ex
parte interviews
In considering this issue, many courts have held that the burden on the
defendant to use formal discovery is less significant than the societal in-
terest in preserving the fiduciary and confidential relationship between
plaintiff and her physician. t2 The physician is not transformed into an
ordinary witness, like a lay person, even upon waiver of the physician-
116. An attorney's work product consists of mental impressions, conclusions and legal theories
prepared or formulated in anticipation of trial. Generally, work product is not discoverable. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3) (1983). Courts have also recognized that the work
product doctrine applies in discovery. See, e.g. Shelton v. America Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323
(8th Cir. 1986); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 754 U.S. 903 (1985).
117. Sterchi and Sheppard, supra note 91; State ex rel. Stuflebaum v. Appelquist, 694 S.W.2d
882 (Mo. App. 1985) (abrogated to the extent that the court cannot compel the plaintiff to authorize
ex parte contact). See State ex reL Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989)).
118. Stufflebaum, 694 S.W.2d at 888.
119. See Stempler v. Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1987); Covington v. Sawyer, 9 Ohio
App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465 (1983).
120. Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990). See also State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan,
776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989); See also Alston v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35
(D.D.C. 1985); Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986);
Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986); Wenninger v. Muesing,
307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d 720 (1987); Smith
v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d
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patient privilege. No other witness is so highly regulated by state licens-
ing procedures, hospital privilege reviews, the Hippocratic Oath, the
AMA Guidelines and applicable state Medico-Legal Guidelines. A phy-
sician, in our society, is treated differently and his unique relationship
with his patient is deserving of protection, even in light of a clear waiver
of the physician-patient privilege.
The formal discovery procedures are not unduly burdensome and ex-
pensive. They are used every day in every type of case.'2 1 Defendants in
personal injury and medical malpractice cases have no right to evade the
use of ordinary discovery procedures. The argument that a less expen-
sive means of discovery is necessary is incongruous with the large dam-
ages typically involved in these cases and with the otherwise lavish
defense outlays for employing expert witnesses and a whole array of
outside consultants. Lastly, the formal discovery devices are the safest
and most efficient way to obtain reliable information, given under oath
and preserved for eventual use at trial in the absence of the witness or in
the event of inconsistent testimony.
Public policy encourages the protection of the confidential, fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient. No competing interest can
be presented to outweigh this public policy.
122
B. The Balance Favors Allowing Ex Parte Communications
A balance must be struck between the patient's right to preserve confi-
dential information and interests served by allowing both parties access
to all relevant evidence. The purpose of the privilege is to induce the
patient to freely disclose his physical condition to the physician, so that
proper treatment may be given.' 23 It has been said, however, that the
privilege "is a shield and not a sword to those who can or may not
speak."' 24 Once information has been disclosed by the patient, the need
for ascertainment of the truth outweighs interests in confidentiality.
The physician-patient privilege is only triggered if the patient's com-
munication to the physician was for the purpose of seeking treatment.1
25
Consultations for insurance examinations or intoxication testing are not
582, aff'd., 73 A.D. 2d 589, 422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1979); Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756
P.2d 138 (1988).
121. Even though a non-treating physician can only be questioned directly through a deposition
under Rule 30, defendant can for the cost of first-class postage send an interrogatory to plaintiff
seeking the names of witnesses with relevant information and the facts which are known by the
witnesses. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-l, R. Civ. P. 33 (1983).
122. See supra text accompanying note 85.
123. Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
124. .Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 23, 116 S.E.2d 137, 142 (1960) (quoting Insurance Co. v.
Kim, 6 N.E. 12 (Ohio 1935)).
125. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 99 (5th ed. 1984).
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protected.126 This is because the policy interests furthered by the privi-
lege are not advanced in these situations. Since the plaintiff is not seek-
ing treatment, no policy is advanced by protecting confidentiality.
Once there has been partial disclosure by the patient, the policy inter-
est in protecting confidentiality is diminished as well. Even though a per-
son may want to shield his private physical condition from the public, "it
is not human, natural or understandable to claim protection from expo-
sure by asserting a privilege for communications to doctors, at the very
time the patient is parading before the public the mental or physical con-
dition as to which he consulted the doctor." ' 7 The plaintiff himself
chooses to file the action and has no right to then complain that his phys-
ical condition has been made public.
Additionally, it has long been recognized that there is "a right to every
man's evidence."' t2I Privileges are an exception to this maxim, therefore,
"are not lightly created or expansively construed, for they are in deroga-
tion for the search for the truth."'1 2 9 Once the patient's disclosure
reaches a certain point, the need for evidence becomes more compelling
than preserving confidentiality.
Once a waiver has occurred, there are virtually no supportable reasons
to prevent defense counsel from unilaterally contacting treating physi-
cians who are "facts and circumstances" witnesses. The court in Turner
made it clear that, absent expert status, a treating physician is no differ-
ent from any other witness. There is nothing that prevents opposing
counsel from speaking with an adversary's witness in private, and it is
commonly done if the witness is willing. The argument asserted by many
courts that ex parte interviews are not authorized by the discovery rules
and are, therefore, improper is absurd for this reason. Technically, the
discovery rules do not authorize witness interviews at all. If this ration-
ale is to be supported, interviews would have to be forbidden entirely,
physician or not. Obviously, this will never happen.
Following waiver, the plaintiff should not be allowed to limit the oppo-
nent's access to relevant evidence. The defendant has a right to find out
all information necessary to defend himself including whether the patient
had a pre-existing condition or whether the alleged injury was caused by
something other than the defendant's conduct.
The argument that ex parte interviews should be prevented to protect
the physician is also untenable. First of all, the physician always has the
126. Id.
127. Id. at § 104 at 256.
128. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
129. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). This case involved whether the Presi-
dent's conversations with his close advisors were confidential, thus enabling him to quash a subpoena
duces tecum of tapes and documents. The Court held that the need for evidence and the fair admin-
istration of justice required disclosure.
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option to refuse to speak to defense counsel; all witnesses do. As a physi-
cian, he, more than anyone, understands the importance of confidential-
ity. In addition, because of the fear of a suit for breach of confidentiality,
the physician will proceed with caution and it is very unlikely that he will
reveal anything beyond the scope of the privilege. On the other hand, if
the physician does possess relevant, unprivileged information that he
wishes to convey to defense counsel, he should be allowed to do so.
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.413 does not prevent plaintiff's attor-
ney from contacting any of plaintiff's treating physicians, either. Physi-
cians are generally independent contractors, therefore, not agents of the
hospital. The defendant needs to contact these physicians to get any in-
formation at all, while the plaintiff himself has first hand knowledge of
the physician's treatment.
The fear that the attorney may be forced to testify regarding impeach-
ment is no greater in this situation than with any other witness. If an
attorney chooses to interview a witness alone and then the witness testi-
fies in a contrary manner at trial, the attorney is placed in a position of
having to testify or forego the impeachment. Consequently, most attor-
neys know better. The situation is no. different when the testifying wit-
ness happens to be a physician.
The cost of litigation continues to increase. Every effort should be
made to reduce this cost in any way that is fair and reasonable. Allowing
ex parte interviews furthers this purpose. Requiring depositions to inter-
view treating physicians is an unnecessary expense. In this situation, this
cost is imposed on the defendant alone. The plaintiff can talk to these
physicians ex parte, but the defendant must pay to obtain the same infor-
mation. This is not only unfair, but serves only to prolong the litigation
process, especially when it could have possibly been discovered in a short
time that the witness had nothing to say.
In a malpractice action, a physician's personal ability and skill are be-
ing attacked. Even if he ultimately prevails, the damage to his reputation
in the community can be irreparable. Therefore, at the very least, the
physician should be placed on equal footing with his opponent, both fi-
nancially and substantively. This is how the adversarial system works.
Absent a privilege, his attorney must be able to interview all facts and
circumstances witnesses ex parte to adequately prepare the case for trial.
The plaintiff at this stage has no right to oversee the defense and monitor
their interpretation of the evidence. The public wants efficient medical
care at a reasonable cost as well. Unless the doctor can adequately de-
fend, himself from accusations, this becomes increasingly difficult to
achieve.
130. North Carolina State Bar Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.4 (1988). See
supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the dual approach of this article suggests, the issues of scope of the
physician-patient privilege, waiver of the privilege and the propriety of ex
parte interviews is one that raises significant questions of law, public pol-
icy and ethics. Despite the Crist decision, the questions that have been
raised here are far from being fully answered. Only through further judi-
cial decisions or legislative enactment will the parties be given the infor-
mation they need to knowingly and intelligently plan how to proceed in
this delicate area.
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